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STATE JURISDICTION AND ON-RESERVATION 
AFFAIRS: PUYALLUP TRIBE V. DEP'T OF GAME 
Judith Gail Dein * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the growing awareness by states of the need to 
enact wildlife conservation laws, and the more organized and vocal 
assertions by Native Americans of their tribal rights, have led to 
much controversy in the courts.! In June of 1977, while deciding the 
case of Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game2 (Puyallup Ill) the 
United States Supreme Court was confronted with a conflict of ever 
increasing importance: the states' power to pass and enforce conser-
vation laws, and the Indians' right to hunt and fish as guaranteed 
in treaties made over 100 years ago. 
In Puyallup III the Supreme Court ignored the guaranteed rights 
of Indians to hunt and fish exclusively and without state interfer-
ence on their reservation, and held that, while enforcing state con-
servation laws, the State of Washington could regulate all fishing 
of the Puyallup Indians. For the first time, no differentiation was 
made between regulation of on- and off-reservation fishing. In an 
ambiguous decision, the Court seemed to ignore traditional con-
cepts of treaty interpretation and tribal sovereignty and held that 
conservation measures take precedence over treaty rights. 
In light of the increased trend towards controlling Indian fishing 
off the reservations, 3 Puyallup III might be interpreted by states as 
a grant of permission to regulate Indian on-reservation fishing in the 
* Staff member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, FISHING RIGHTS OF THE 
MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 107-46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY]. 
2 _ U.S. _, 97 S.Ct. 2616 (1977). 
3 See generally Finnegan, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A 
Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REv. 61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Indian Treaty Analysis]. 
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name of conservation, despite the ambiguities of the Court's deci-
sion. Thus, Puyallup III raises serious questions as to the continuing 
validity of federal treaties made with the various Indian tribes. 
In order to understand the Puyallup III decision, this article will 
begin with a discussion of the general concepts necessary for a basic 
understanding of Indian law. Attention will focus on several major 
areas: treaties, jurisdiction, reservations, and the traditional basis 
for the different treatment of Indians on and off their reservation. 
Then, the article will deal with the long history of the Puyallup 
controversy, a complex litigation spanning some 13 years and in-
volving decisions in both state and federal courts, including three 
United States Supreme Court decisions. Alternative readings of 
Puyallup III will be discussed and analyzed, and the article will 
conclude with an evaluation of the case's potential impact on future 
reservation affairs. 
n. GENERAL CONCEPTS OF INDIAN LAW 
"Indian law"4 includes almost every field of law known in modem 
times. Since a complete study of the general concepts of Indian law 
would be beyond the scope of this article, this section will deal only 
with those concepts necessary for an understanding of the Puyallup 
litigation. 
A. Indian Treaties 
Until 1871, the treaty was the traditional means by which the 
United States government dealt with the Indian tribes.s In 1871, 
however, the power of Congress to make treaties with the Indians 
was terminated,8 but Congress explicitly mandated that treaties 
• The federal law governing Indians is a mass of statutes, treaties, and judicial and 
administrative rulings, that includes practically all the fields of law known to textbook 
writers - the law of real property, contracts, corporations, torts, domestic relations, 
procedure, criminal law, federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, conflict of laws, and 
international law. And in each of these fields the fact that Indians are involved gives the 
basic doctrines and concepts of the field a new quirk which sometimes carries unpredicta-
ble consequences. 
Margold, Introduction to F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW xxii (1942) [hereinafter cited as 
COHEN]. 
• In the Colonial period the European settlers realized that the Indians could outfight 
them. As a result, negotiated peace with the Indians was considered desirable, and treaty-
making was the method employed to implement this goal. Treatymaking, as well as acquiring 
title to Indian land either by consent or purchase implied a recognition of the Indian groups 
as independent sovereign powers. See Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 
58 CAUl. L. REV. 445, 452 (1970). 
• 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). Almost 1 billion acres in 400 treaties were acquired between 1778 
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made prior to that date were to continue in force until superceded 
by a congressional act.7 Thus, as a noted scholar of Indian law 
stated, "one who attempts to survey the legal problems raised by 
Indian treaties must at the outset dispose of the objection that such 
treaties are somehow of inferior validity or are of purely antiquarian 
interest. "8 
Treaties with the Indians, according to the United States Consti-
tution, are part of the supreme law of the land. 9 As a consequence, 
no state can enforce legislation which contradicts a treaty.IO How-
ever, Congress itself has the power to enact legislation in conflict 
with Indian treaties, similar to its power in the field of foreign af-
fairs.ll Despite congressional authority to change unilaterally the 
terms of a treaty by enacting subsequent conflicting legislation, the 
courts have held that treaty rights cannot be abrogated by implica-
tion.12 An intent to terminate such rights will not be imputed to 
Congress absent a clear statement or conclusive legislative history 
showing such an intent. 13 
Two basic rules of construction have evolved .regarding Indian 
treaties: ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indians,14 and 
doubtful clauses are interpreted in light of the Indians' understand-
ing of them at the time the treaties were signed. 15 These rules 
and 1871. Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 OSGOODE HALL. 
L. REv. 119, 123 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Aboriginal Rights]. It has been stated that the 
abandonment of the treaty was a "recognition of the deterioration of tribal status from a 
position of substantial autonomy to one of nearly complete subservience." Oliver, The Legal 
Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REv. 193, 200 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Legal 
Status]. 
1 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). "[B]ut no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with 
any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be invalidated or impaired." Id. 
8 COHEN, supra note 4, at 33. 
t U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 34, and cases cited therein; 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
10 As in all areas of law, with proper jurisdiction, federal law preempts state law under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
11 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565·66 (1903). See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 
34. 
12 E.g., United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 
U.S. 213 (1902). 
13 Burnett, Indian Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Rights: The Record and the 
Controversy, 7 IDAHO L. REv. 49, 60 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Record and the 
Controversy] . 
.. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515, 551-53 (1832). See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 37 . 
.. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-53 (1832); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, 
10-11 (1899). See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 37; Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3, at 66 
n.30. 
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evolved from the proposition that all powers which are lawfully 
vested in an Indian tribe are not delegated powers granted by ex-
press act of Congress, "but rather inherent powers of a limited sov-
ereignty which has never been extinguished."18 The sole limitation 
on these rules of construction is that the courts will not ignore a 
condition or requirement of the treaty simply because of any notions 
of equity, general convenience or substantial justice.17 
Treaty content varies from tribe to tribe. ls Basically, however, 
treaties define the rights and reciprocal obligations of the Indians 
and the United States government.19 Again, one must remember 
that these treaties were "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a 
grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted."20 
Most treaties contain no express provisions on civil jurisdiction and 
therefore, "by implication, confirm the rule that tribal law governs 
the members of the tribe within the Indian country, to the exclusion 
of state law."21 The few treaties which explicitly and emphatically 
assure that state laws will not be applied to the Indians are usually 
with tribes that had prior problems with state jurisdiction.22 
Integral to many treaties is the agreement of the Indians to live 
exclusively on certain designated tracts of land known as reserva-
tions, and the ceding of the land on which the Indians had pre-
viously lived to the United States government. The Indians, while 
relinquishing the right to continue to live on such ceded land, 
usually retained the right to hunt, trap and fish at the places which 
they frequented prior to resettlement on the reservation.23 Such fish-
ing, taking place on lands ceded to the United States and outside 
the reservation boundaries, is called off-reservation fishing. 
The Treaty of Medicine Creek, made with the Puyallup Tribe in 
" COHEN, supra note 4, at 122. 
17 United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900); United States v. Minnesota, 270 
U.S. 181 (1926). See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 37. 
" COHEN, supra note 4, at 39. Among the most important subjects covered in treaties are: 
(1) the international status of the tribe, (2) the dependence of the tribe on the United States, 
(3) commercial relations of the tribe, (4) jurisdiction, and (5) control over tribal affairs. Id. 
,. COHEN, supra note 4, at 33 . 
.. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
21 COHEN, supra note 4, at 45. 
22 Id. at 45-46. An example of such a situation is the treaty of May 6, 1828 with the Cherokee 
Nation. This treaty guaranteed the Indians "a home that shall never, in all future time, be 
embarrassed by having extended around it the lines, or placed over it the jurisdiction of a 
Territory or State .... " Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, United States:Cherokee 
Nation, 7 Stat. 311 (1828) . 
.. The Record and the Controversy, supra note 13, at 69. 
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1854,24 is exempletive of a treaty guaranteeing the Indians' right to 
fish off the reservation. Article III of the treaty states that "[ t]he 
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations, is further secured to said Indians in common with all citi-
zens of the Territory."25 
The right to hunt and fish on the reservation free from state 
interference is generally considered to be implied in treaties which 
distinguish reservation tracts from ceded lands. 2ft In Menominee 
Tribe v. United States,27 the Supreme Court found that a grant of 
land "to be held as Indian lands are held"28 included a reservation 
of the right to fish and hunt on those lands. The Court quoted from 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin: 
It would seem unlikely that the Menominees would have knowingly 
relinquished their special fishing and hunting rights which they enjoyed 
on their own lands, and have accepted in exchange other lands with 
respect to which such rights did not extend. They undoubtedly believed 
that these rights were guaranteed to them when these other lands were 
ceded to them 'to be held as Indian lands are held.' Construing this 
ambiguous provision of the 1854 treaty favorably to the Menominees, we 
determine that they enjoyed the same exclusive hunting rights free from 
the restrictions of the state's game laws over the ceded lands, which 
comprised the Menominee Indian Reservation, as they had enjoyed over 
the lands ceded to the United States by the 1848 treaty.29 
Likewise, Article IT of the Treaty of Medicine Creek created the 
Puyallup Indian Reservation with broad language of preserved 
rights: 
There is . . . reserved for the present use and occupation of the said 
tribes and bands the following tracts of land. . . all of which tracts shall 
be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their 
exclusive use; nor shall any white man be permitted to reside upon the 
same without permission of the tribe and the superintendent or agent.3D 
24 Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States: Nisquallys & c., 10 Stat. 1132 
(1854). In this treaty the Indians ceded 2,240,000 acres for a price of $32,500 to be paid over 
a 20 year period. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 25. 
21 Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States:Nisquallys & c., 10 Stat. 1132, 
1133 (1854) (emphasis added). 
21 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 84. See also Hobbs, Indian Hunting and 
Fishing Rights, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 504, 511 (1964). 
11 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
28 Id. at 406. 
21 Id. at 406 n.2. 
31 Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States: Nisquallys & c., 10 Stat. 1132, 
1133 (1854) (emphasis added). At the time the Treaty of Medicine Creek was signed the 
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Although not explicitly mentioned, using common rules of con-
struction such as interpreting the treaties as the Indians would have 
understood them and resolving ambiguities in favor of the Indians, 
hunting and fishing rights should be implied. 
B. Jurisdiction 
A great deal of dispute exists as to who has jurisdiction over 
Indian affairs, the Indians, the federal government, or the states. In 
the words of one authority, "[t]he Indians' right of self-government 
is a right which has been consistently protected by the courts, fre-
quently recognized and intermittently ignored by treaty-makers 
and legislators, and very widely disregarded by administrative offi-
cials. "31 The basis for this right of self-government stems from the 
fact that at the time of treaty making, the Indians were considered 
sovereign nations relinquishing substantial rights.32 
Throughout the years the federal government acquired increasing 
control over Indian affairs.33 Various sources have been relied upon 
to prove that the federal government has jurisdiction over Indian 
activities. First, and most commonly cited, is the United States 
Constitution which grants Congress the authority to control com-
merce with the Indian tribes,34 to make expenditures for the public 
welfare,35 to regulate the property of the United States,36 and to 
make treaties with the Indians.37 A second source of federal power 
is based on a court-created guardian/ward theory which views the 
Indians as people in need of governmental protection.38 Finally, the 
Puyallups were actively involved in fishing. They used the fish for trade, food and a medium 
for exchange. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 370 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Thus, 
at the time the treaty was signed fishing rights were undoubtedly considered when the reser-
vation was set apart for the Indians' "use and occupation." 
31 COHEN, supra note 4, at 122. 
32 See text at note 16, supra. 
33 The trend toward federal intervention in on-reservation Indian affairs began in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, with the country's response to the Supreme Court decision in 
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). In Crow Dog, the Court held that a federal district 
court lacked jurisdiction to try a Buile Sioux for the on-reservation murder of another Buile 
because federal law did not apply to on-reservation crimes between Indians. The American 
public was horrified that the accused murderer was beyond the reach of its courts. Congress 
reacted to the furor by passing the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), which 
gave federal courts criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians. See Com-
ment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CAlJF. L. REv. 445, 456-57 (1970) . 
.. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
:IIi U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
H U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
38 COHEN, supra note 4, at 90. For a detailed discussion of the growth of the wardship 
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treaties themselves have been cited as showing that the Indians 
granted the federal government control over their affairs.3D Specific 
treaty provisions, which often control jurisdictional determinations, 
add even more confusion to the dispute over who has jurisdiction 
over Indian affairs. 
Numerous authors have criticized the extensive power of the fed-
eral government in Indian affairs, claiming that federal regulation 
should be limited to situations expressly delegated to Congress. in 
the Constitution, such as interstate commerce}O However, the exist-
ence of extensive federal involvement in Indian affairs can no longer 
be denied: 
One authority has argued persuasively that this federal power (over the 
Indians) is founded upon treaties; but whether it be treaties, the com-
merce clause, wardship, or mere coercion, the fact is that the govern-
ment has the power, and it is now far too late in the day to question its 
legitimacy.41 
States, too, have claimed jurisdiction to regulate Indian affairs. 
The basis for their claim is the constitutional doCtrine that states 
possess original and complete sovereignty over their own territory 
except as such sovereignty is limited by the United States Constitu-
tion.42 State jurisdiction over Indian affairs has been severely lim-
ited by several factors, however. First, much of the area has been 
explicitly preempted by the federal government.43 An additional 
curtailment of state power has been in the. treaties themselves, 44 
treaties are the supreme law of the land,45 and they "quite generally 
promised the tribes, either expressly or by implication, that they 
would not be subject to the sovereignty of the individual states, but 
would be subject only to the Federal Government."46 Finally, the 
intermittently recognized right of tribal sovereignty has served as a 
doctrine see Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3, at 68-85. 
.. Legal Status, supra note 6, at 203 . 
.. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 4, at 90. 
II Legal Status, supra note 6, at 203 . 
• 2 Ward v. Racehorse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); COHEN, supra note 4, at 117. See also Indian 
Treaty Analysis, supra note 3, at 67 . 
.. See Legal Status, supra note 6, at 211-12. For example, Congress has stated that it alone 
can authorize the sale of reservation lands, and, as a consequence, neither the Indians nor 
the states can approve the alienation of reservation lands without congressional consent. 
Federal law has preempted the field. COHEN, supra note 4, at 320-24 . 
.. See text at note 21, supra. 
.. See text at note 9, supra . 
.. COHEN, supra note 4, at 117. 
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limi tation on state jurisdiction.47 
As a consequence of federal preemption, tribal self-government, 
and treaty provisions, states have no inherent on-reservation juris-
diction. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 48 a case 
concerned with the question of whether a state may tax a reserva-
tion Indian for income earned exclusively on the reservation, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The principles governing the resolution of this question are not new. On 
the contrary, '(t)he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction 
and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.' This policy was 
first articulated by this Court 141 years ago when Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall held that Indian nations were 'distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, 
and having a right to all the lands within these boundaries, which is not 
only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.' It followed 
from this concept of Indian reservations as separate, although depen-
dent nations, that state law could have no role to play withiri the reser-
vation.49 
As a general rule, Indians who are off the reservation are subject, 
to the same extent as aliens or non-Indian citizens, to the laws of 
the state.50 Once off the reservation, Indians are no longer consid-
ered members of a distinct political community, and the interest of 
the state becomes predominate.51 
Despite the fact that the Indian right to fish both on and off the 
reservation is guaranteed by their treaties the courts have followed 
" See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In this case the State of 
Georgia, in an attempt to destroy the tribal government of the Cherokees, imprisoned a white 
man living among the Cherokees with consent of tribal authorities for residing among the 
Cherokees without a license. The arrest was found unconstitutional. Id. at 561-62. 
I. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
II Id. at 168. The courts have on occasion extended the wardship doctrine to allow state 
jurisdiction over some on-reservation activities. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), a 
case concerned with a non-Indian who brought suit against reservation Indians to collect for 
goods sold on the reservation for credit, the Court created the infringement test. The test 
states that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the 
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them." Id. at 220. This infringement test has never been used in cases concerning on-
reservation fishing rights. This test was raised, however, as a possible standard of review by 
the Indians in Puyallup III, but was ignored by all courts in the Puyallup litigation. Brief for 
Petitioners, at 20-27, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, __ U.S. _, 97 S.Ct. 2616 
(1977) . 
.. 'COHEN, supra note 4, at 119. 
5' See, e.g., In Re Wolf, 27 F. 606,610 (D.C. Ark. 1886). See also COHEN, supra note 4, at 
119, and cases cited therein. 
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a pattern analogous to the previously defined on-and off-reservation 
dichotomy. Until Puyallup II/52 it was well established that the 
states were without jurisdiction over Indians fishing on their reser-
vation. 53 Off-reservation fishing, however, has been subject to state 
regulation despite a great deal of criticism to the contrary. 54 
Despite the fact that states lack inherent jurisdiction over on-
reservation affairs, Congress has the power to delegate such author-
ity to the states and has done so in many cases.55 For example, 
Congress has granted several states the right to assume civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian activities on the reservation.56 The 
State of Washington acquired civil and criminal jurisdiction within 
the Puyallup Reservation in 1957, pursuant to Public Law 280: 57 
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not 
having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of 
action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume 
jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State 
.2 Puyallup Tribe Inc. v. Dep't of Game, __ U.S. __ , 97 S. Ct. 2616 (1977). 
" Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971); 
Arnett v. Five Gill Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d 454 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); People 
v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W. 2d 375 (1971). Writers on the subject ofIndian fishing 
rights have stated definitively that on-reservation fishing is not subject to state control. See, 
e.g., Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3, at 72-73. A major reason for the difference in 
treatment between on- and off-reservation fishing cases, where both the right to fish on and 
off the reservation is preserved in the treaties, is the particular wording of such treaties. The 
off-reservation right to fish is usually "in common with" others, while the on-reservation right 
is exclusive. 
51 See Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3; Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-
Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as A Supreme Court Error]. 
55 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970)). 
This section gives the states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin jurisdiction over offenses by or against Indians in certain areas of Indian country 
located within the states. 
51 Id. 
51 Pub. L. No. 280 § 7, 67 Stat. 590 (1953) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 79 
(1968)). The State of Washington passed legislation in 1957, chapter 37.12 of the Revised 
Code of Washington, to take advantage of Public Law 280. This chapter provided that the 
state could assume jurisdiction on a reservation at the request of the tribe. The Puyallups 
never requested such jurisdiction, but it had been imposed years before. See UNCOMMON 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 51-52. The Washington law also states: 
Nothing in this chapter shall ... authorize regulation of the use of such property in a 
manner inconsistent with any federal treaty, [or] agreement ... or shall deprive any 
Indian or any Indian tribe, band or community of any right, privilege, or immunity 
afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, statute, or executive order with respect to 
Indian land grants, hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or regulation 
thereof. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.060 (1964). 
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shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to 
assumption thereof. 58 
This jurisdiction, however, does not extend to any "right, privilege, 
or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute 
with respect to hunting, trapping or fishing or the control, licensing, 
or regulation thereof. "59 
The Supreme Court discussed this statute in the case of 
Menominee Tribe u. United States. 60 In that case, the Menominee 
Tribe was requesting compensation for the loss of their hunting and 
fishing rights which the Wisconsin Supreme Court6 ! had held abro-
gated by the Menominee Termination Act of 1954.62 The Termina-
tion Act provided for the termination of federal supervision over the 
property and members of the tribe, whereupon state laws were to 
become applicable to the Menominees in the same manner as ap-
plied to others. The Supreme Court interpreted Public Law 280 as 
protecting the hunting, trapping, and fishing rights guaranteed by 
any federal treaty, and concluded that a reading of the Termination 
Act and Public Law 280 together led to the conclusion that 
"although federal supervision of the tribe was to cease and all tribal 
property was to be transferred to new hands, the hunting and fishing 
rights granted or preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of 1854 sur-
vived the Termination Act of 1954."63 While the Court did not ex-
plain whether the exclusivity of hunting and fishing rights termi-
nated with the reservation, it did affirm the existence of these 
rights. 64 The clear implication of the Court's holding is that Public 
Law 280 does not extend state jurisdiction over fishing rights guar-
anteed by federal treaty. 65 
.. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 90·284, 82 Stat. 79 (1968)). 
The repeal of the quoted section of Pub. L. No. 280 did not affect Washington's assumption 
of jurisdiction, as it was assumed prior to repeal. This section was the only section repealed. 
As Pub. L. No. 90·284 says "such repeal shall not affect any cessation of jurisdiction made 
pursuant to such section prior to its repeal." Pub. L. No. 90·284, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) . 
•• 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b)(1970) . 
.. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
" State v. Sanapaw, 21 Wisc. 2d 377, 124 N.W. 2d 41 (1963). 
" 68 Stat. 250 (1954), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891·902 (1970). The Treaty of Wolf River, 
May 12, 1854, United States: Menominees, 10 Stat. 1064 (1854), guaranteed the rights in 
question. 
13 391 U.S. 404, 411 (1968) . 
.. [d. at 406·07 . 
•• The Menominee case does not stand for the proposition that all rights reserved on a 
reservation are exclusive, because the Court refused to deal with this issue. The Court did 
say, however, that hunting and fishing rights exist on a reservation even though such rights 
are not explicitly reserved, and that the granting of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs in 
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In sum, states have no inherent jurisdiction over the activities of 
Indians within their reservation boundaries. Nevertheless, Congress 
has granted the State of Washington, among others, on-reservation 
civil and criminal jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, according to the 
Court, does not extend to treaty-guaranteed hunting and fishing 
rights. 
C. Indian Reservations 
The status of an Indian reservation is a concept necessary to an 
understanding of the Puyallup litigation. A confusing characteristic 
of reservations is that all the land within the reservation boundaries 
does not have to belong to the Indians themselves. In Mattz v. 
Arnett,88 the Supreme Court found that the sale of land within 
reservation boundaries was not sufficient to terminate a reserva-
tion's status. Quoting from an earlier decision,87 the Court noted 
that ""f w]hen Congress has once established a reservation, all 
tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until 
separated therefrom by Congress.' A con~essional determination 
to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear 
from the surrounding circumstances and by legislative history."88 
In Mattz, the Court also cited the congressional definition of 
"Indian Country" to support the contention that the sale of land 
within reservation boundaries does not necessitate the extinction of 
the reservation.8D Indian Country is defined as "all land within the 
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, 
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation."70 In 
an earlier case,71 the Court explained the situation which prompted 
this definition: 
[w]here the existence or nonexistence of an Indian reservation, and 
therefore the existence or nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends 
upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement offi-
cers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in 
Public Law 280 did not destroy those rights. Other cases and authorities which have dealt 
with the extent of such implied on·reservation hunting and fishing rights have found them 
to be exclusive. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra . 
.. 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
17 United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) . 
.. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973). 
II [d. at 504. 
,. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970) (emphasis added). 
71 Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
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order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular 
offense, even though committed within the reservation, is in the State 
or Federal Government.72 
The dispute in Puyallup III centered on the issue of what treaty 
rights were retained by an Indian tribe in land within the reserva-
tion which had been sold. Before examining the Supreme Court's 
solution to this problem, it is useful to review the long history of the 
Puyallup litigation. 
III. HISTORY OF THE PUYALLUP LITIGATION 
The Puyallup Indians were parties to the Treaty of Medicine 
Creek.73 This treaty was negotiated by Washington's Governor Ste-
vens in 1854 for the purpose of extinguishing Indian claims to the 
land in Washington Territory, and to provide for the peaceful and 
compatible coexistence oflndians and non-Indians in the area.74 As 
noted previously, Article II of the treaty created the Puyallup Reser-
vation for the Indians' "exclusive use."75 In addition to the exclusive 
rights of the Indians on the reservation, Article III of the treaty 
guaranteed the Indians' right to fish "in common with" the settlers 
of the Territory off the reservation at the locations where they had 
usually fished. 78 
The Puyallup Reservation, as created by the Medicine Creek 
treaty, originally contained approximately 1,200 acres, but was later 
expanded to include over 23,000 acres.77 Presently, however, the 
Puyallups are greatly assimilated into the non-Indian society of the 
72 [d. at 358. 
73 Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States: Nisquallys, & c., 10 Stat. 1132 
(1854). 
" United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Treaties with 
6,000 Puget Sound Indians were made in a period of a few months, including treaties signed 
at Medicine Creek, Point Elliot, Point No Point, Neah Bay, and Quinalt R.iver. The treaties, 
although written in English, were negotiated in the Chinook jargon, a jargon of only some 
300 words garnered from several Indian languages and from English and French. 
A few months before he took action, Governor Stevens outlined the goals he sought in 
treaties. Their basic purpose was to allow the Indians enough land and farm instruments so 
that a homestead farming pattern would encourage the Indians to disappear into the Ameri-
can melting pot within one generation. Governor Stevens seemed to have been impressed with 
the importance of the fish to the Indians. He understood that one indispensable requirement 
for securing any agreement with the Indians of the Pacific Northwest was to assure them of 
their continued right to fish. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 18-25. 
" See text at note 30, supra. 
" See text at note 25, supra. 
77 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 53. 
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State of Washington.78 The Puyallups have sold most of their land 
and now hold title to only 22 acres of land which are being used as 
a tribal cemetery. Indeed, the lands within the reservation bounda-
ries now comprise an integral part of the City of Tacoma.79 
A. Puyallup I 
The Puyallup litigation began in 1963 in the Superior Court of the 
State of Washington. 80 The Department of Game and the Depart-
ment of Fisheries of Washington brought an action against the Puy-
allup Tribe and various individual tribal members to determine 
what rights, privileges, or immunities individual tribal members 
had with reference to the state's laws regulating fishing in the Puy-
allup River and adjacent waters. The Department of Game regu-
lates steelhead trout fishing in the waters in question, since steel-
head are considered a game fish, while the Department of Fisheries 
regulates the food fish, salmon. According to regulations promul-
gated by these departments, steelhead may be taken only by hook 
and not commercially, 81 and salmon may be taken commercially 
with nets of a certain type in certain areas.82 Set nets or fixed appli-
ances are barred in "any waters" of the state for the taking of 
salmon or steelhead.83 Nonetheless, the Puyallup Indians used set 
nets to fish in Commencement Bay, at the mouth of the Puyallup 
River, and in areas upstream. They fished commercially as well as 
for their own needs and all parties agreed that the nets used were 
illegal if the regulations of the State of Washington were applicable 
to the Puyallups.84 
The trial court determined that neither the Puyallup Tribe nor 
the Puyallup Reservation still existed. Consequently, the Puyallups 
could claim no treaty rights and were subject to the state's laws. An 
injunction to prevent net fishing by the Indians was granted.85 
" Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 253, 422 P.2d 754, 759 (1967). 
" [d. at 251, 422 P.2d at 758 . 
.. The decision of the State Superior Court is unreported. 
81 Wash. Dep't of Game Perm. Reg. No. 34 (1964). 
82 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 75.12.140, 75.12.010 (1962). 
83 WASH. REV. CODE § 75.12.060 (1962); WASH. REv. CODE § 77.16.060 (1962) . 
.. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 396 (1968). The fish in dispute in the 
Puyallup litigation were four types of salmon and steelhead trout. They are all anadromous 
fish that hatch in the fresh water of the Puyallup and Nisqually Rivers. The fish come into 
the ocean, pass through the salt water of Puget Sound, enter the fresh waters at the mouths 
of rivers and go up river to spawn. The adult salmon die after spawning, but the adult 
steelhead may live on for some time. [d. at 395. For a detailed discussion of the fishing 
situation see UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 147-85 . 
.. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 248, 422 P.2d 754, 756 (1967). 
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On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court88 held that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of the Puyallup 
Tribe since Congress still recognized the tribe. The court agreed, 
however, that the reservation had been extinguished and held that 
no fishing fights derived from any rights in the reservation lands 
could be claimed.87 The basis for the court's determination that the 
reservation no longer existed was the lower court's finding of signifi-
cant acreage depletion: 
All the lands within the exterior boundaries of the old Puyallup Indian 
Reservation were sold, iIi fee simple absolute, pursuant to an act of 
Congress (33 Stat. 565) with the exception of two small tracts which are 
presently being utilized as a cemetery for members of the federal organi-
zation known as the 'Puyallup Tribe.' The total acreage remaining in 
trust status is approximately 22 acres. The original reservation was in 
excess of 18,000 acres.88 
The Washington Supreme Court held that once the Indians had 
terminated their reservation by alienating their land in fee simple 
absolute, they could not claim that there was an implied reservation 
of exclusive hunting and fishing rights.81 Consequently, exclusive 
rights, as expressly guaranteed by Article IT of the Treaty of Medi-
cine Creek, could not be asserted. However, as the Mattz case held, 
the alienation of reservation land can be "completely consistent 
.. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 422 P.2d 754 (1967). 
17 Article n of the Treaty of Medicine Creek established a reservation for the Puyallups' 
exclusive use. Using traditional concepts of treaty interpretation, exclusive fishing should be 
among those rights reserved by Article n. See text at notes 26-30, 8upra . 
.. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 253, 422 P.2d 754, 759 (1967). 
Article VI of the Treaty of Medicine Creek gave the President the authority to remove the 
Indians to another place upon paying the Indians for improvements and the expenses of their 
removal. It also allowed him to divide the reservation into lots and assign such lots to 
individual Indians or families. Such a division was authorized by the General Allotment Act 
of 1887. 24 Stat. 388 (1887). In 1893, Congress enacted the Puyallup Allotment Act, 27 Stat. 
612,633 (1893). This Act provided for a three-member commission, appointed by the Presi-
dent, to select and appraise property within the Puyallup Reservation. It further provided 
for the sale of lands within the reservation with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 
However; the Act specifically provided that the Indians would not have the power of aliena-
tion of the allotted lands for a period of ten years, 27 Stat. 633 (1893). On April 28, 1904, an 
Act confirming the removal of restrictions upon alienation by the Puyallup Indians of their 
allotted land was pa8Bed, Pub. L. No. 248, 33 Stat. 565 (1904). The trial court in Puyallup I 
"found that all lands within the boundaries of the reservation created by the Treaty have 
been transferred to private ownership pursuant to these Acts of Congre8B, with the exception 
of two small tracts used as a cemetery for members of the tribe, and much of it is now in the 
City of Tacoma." Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 394 (1968). 
.. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 254, 422 P .2d 754, 759-60 (1967). 
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with continued reservation status."DO The issue which then becomes 
relevant is whether the exclusive hunting and fishing rights still 
exist if the reservation still exists but much of the land on the 
reservation has been alienated. This question, which forms the basis 
for the Puyallup IIIlitigation, was never considered by the'Washing-
ton Supreme Court in Puyallup I since the court found that the 
reservation had been extinguished. 
All treaty provisions not dependent upon the existence of a reser-
vation were still valid, however, because the Puyallup Tribe still 
existed.D1 Article III of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, which gave the 
Puyallups the "right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations. . . in common with all citizens of the Terri-
tory" was still applicable. This right to take fish "in common with" 
the others was interpreted by the court to mean that although the 
Indians did have the right to fish, such off-reservation fishing could 
be regulated by the state. This interpretation mandated that all 
fishing be considered "off-reservation" since it was determined that 
the reservation no longer existed. The court ruled that any regula-
tion had to be "reasonable and necessary" for the preservation of 
fisheries. Since the trial court's injunction was found to be too 
broad, the case was remanded. 
The Puyallup Indians appealed the case to the United· States 
Supreme Court.92 A major issue throughout the litigation was 
whether or not the state courts had jurisdiction to entertain the 
action. The Puyallups claimed tribal immunity from any action in 
state court without tribal consent or the consent of the United 
States government. D3 The Supreme Court, however, denied the Indi-
ans' claim: 
This case . . . is a suit to enjoin violations of state law by individual 
tribal members fishing off the reservation. As such, it is analagous to 
prosecution of individual Indians for crimes committed off reservation 
.. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _ U.S. _, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2626 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
" Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245,261,422 P.2d 754, 763 (1967). 
" Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) . 
.. It is well established that a tribe has immunity from suit in the state courts absent its 
consent or the consent of the federal government. See United States v. United States Fidelity 
and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). The Puyallups claimed that fishing rights were tribal 
property, and consequently this was a suit against the tribe. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 
391 U.S. 392, 396-97, n. 11 (1968). However, the Puyallups' argument was rejected by the 
Court. Contra, Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Indian fishing rights 
held to be tribal property). 
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lands, a matter for which there has been no grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to federal courts.9• 
While apparently basing its jurisdictional decision on a finding 
that the fishing in question was off the reservation, the Court re-
fused to determine whether or not a reservation still existed. In a 
footnote the court stated: 
Whether in light of this history the reservation has been extinguished is 
a question we do not reach. The Washington Supreme Court seems to 
hold that the right to fish in streams once within the old reservation is 
protected by the Article TIl guarantee. There are indeed no other fishing 
rights specifically reserved in the Treaty of Medicine Creek except those 
covered by Article TIl. 95 
It remains unclear whether the Court was really agreeing that the 
reservation had been terminated, since this was a basis for the state 
court's finding that Article III was controlling, or whether the Court 
was saying that the conveyance of the land included the conveyance 
of the exclusive fishing rights on those lands, thereby leaving only 
the right to fish in common with the citizens of the Territory regard-
less of the reservation status. If the latter interpretation is correct, 
it is even more unclear how the Court substantiated its jurisdic-
tional finding that the suit was analagous to the prosecution of 
individuals for crimes committed off the reservation,96 when it was 
in fact saying that the fishing may be taking place on the reserva-
tion. Alternatively, the Court may have found that the exclusive 
right to the land, as guaranteed in Article II of the Treaty, did not 
include fishing rights. This interpretation of the holding, however, 
would fail as contradictory to the general concept of Indian law that 
exclusive fishing rights are implied on a reservation.97 The refusal 
.. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 396-97 n.ll (1968) . 
.. [d. at 394-95 n.1. 
.. See text at notes 42-65, supra, for discussion of state jurisdiction on and off a reservation. 
The Court itself in Puyallup [ noted that certain aspects of criminal prosecution have been 
granted exclusively to federal courts for on-reservation acts. The Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 1153 
(1970) (listing specific crimes committed by Indians within Indian country and placing them 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) (giving 
states jurisdiction over on-reservation offenses, but excluding hunting and fishing rights from 
such jurisdiction). See text at notes 55-65, supra. The Court also cited Seymour v. Superin-
tendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), and U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) (criminal acts 
performed by Indians within Indian country found to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts). Thus, the Court in Puyallup [implied that were the fishing done on a 
reservation, the state would have no jurisdiction. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 
392, 396 n.ll (1968). 
" See text at notes 23-30, supra. 
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of the Supreme Court to determine whether or not the reservation 
still e~isted was the major basis for confusion throughout the Puyal-
lup litigation.Ds 
In affirming the state court's interpretation of Article Ill, the 
Supreme Court held that although the state could not qualify the 
Indians' treaty right to fish "at all usual and accustomed places," 
the state could regulate the manner of fishing in the interest of 
conservation, provided the regulations meet appropriate standards 
and do not discriminate against the Indians. DD The case was re-
manded to determine if the state's prohibition against the use of set 
nets was "reasonable and necessary"lIlO for the purpose of conserva-
tion, with the proviso that "any ultimate findings on the conserva-
tion issue must also cover the issue of equal protection implicit in 
the phrase 'in common with'."lol 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Puyallup I, the De-
partment of Fisheries promulgated regulations limiting commercial 
net fishing for salmon but permitting Indian net fishing for salmon 
in the Puyallup River. The Department of Game, however, contin-
ued its total prohibition on net fishing for steelhead trout.I02 These 
new regulations were considered in light of the remand from the 
Supreme Court. 
B. Puyallup II 
The Superior Court of the State of Washington upheld the De-
partment of Fisheries' regulations which permitted Indian net fish-
ing for salmon in the Puyallup River. lo3 The court found, however, 
that the· Department of Game had not met its burden of proving 
that the total ban on net fishing for steelhead trout was "reasonable 
and necessary" for the conservation of the fishery. Consequently, 
the prior injunction of net fishing for trout was dissolved. The Wash-
ington Supreme Courtl04 affirmed the lower court's decision, but 
.. See text at notes 133-63, infra . 
.. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). 
, .. 1d. at 401 n.14. 
,0' 1d. at 403. 
'02 It has been suggested that since the Department of Game receives no funds from the 
general tax revenues of the state, and because its funds come principally from sport fishing 
license fees and other license fees and tags which the Indians are not required to buy, sport 
fishermen feel that the game fish, especially the steelhead, belong to them. UNCOMMON 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 63. 
," The decision of the State Superior Court is not reported. 
,0' Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wash. 2d 561, 497 P.2d 171 (1972). 
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found that the ban on trout fishing was valid for the year 1970. The 
court held, however, that a permanent total injunction against trout 
net fishing was automatically invalid in light of the Puyallup I rule 
that the Indians' right to take fish could not be abrogated.105 Conse-
quently, the court ordered the Department of Game to remove the 
injunction when it was no longer necessary for the conservation of 
fish. The Department was also ordered to demonstrate annually the 
necessity of conservation regulations affecting the Puyallup Indian 
fishery. 
The Department of Game's regulations were the only regulations 
in question when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Puyallup II. 108 The Supreme Court reasserted the proposition that 
off-reservation fishing rights of the Indians were subject to certain 
state regulations, but that those regulations must be reasonable and 
necessary, and not discriminatory against the Indians. The Court 
found the Department of Game's ban on trout net fishing to be 
discriminatory since hook and line trout fishing, which the Court 
found to be entirely preempted by non-Indians, was allowed. 107 The 
case was remanded so that non-discriminatory regulations could be 
created. Since the only decision which had been made regarding the 
status of the Puyallup Reservation to date was that it no longer 
exi'sted, Puyallup II involved only off-reservation fishing: on-
reservation fishing rights were not in issue. 
C. Federal Court Cases 
Following the decision in Puyallup II, and prior to the state 
courts' decision on remand, two cases involving the Puyallup Indi-
ans were decided in the lower federal courts. In the first case,108 the 
court had to decide whether the Puyallup Reservation still existed, 
and, consequently, whether the state could regulate fishing within 
the reservation. Parties to this suit were the United States and·the 
State of Washington. The District Court for the Western District of 
Washington determined that certain Indian reservations, including 
, .. [d. at 571, 497 P.2d at 178. 
'01 Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973). 
,01 [d. at 48. 
, .. United States v. Washington, No. 39-71C3 (W.O. Wash., Jan. 29, 1973). This case was 
brought in federal court for two major reasons. First, the court determined that the existence 
of a reservation was a federal question. Second, it was found that the existence of the Puyal-
lup Reservation had been left open by the Supreme Court in Puyallup l. United States v. 
Washington, 496 F.2d 620,620 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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the Puyallup's, no longer existed and, consequently, that the Indi-
ans could not fish free from state interference. lOB The United States 
appealed the decision. 
The Court of Appeals reversedl10 and found that the Puyallup 
Reservation was still in existence. In a short decision, the court 
found that the legislative history in the case of the Puyallups did 
not show an intent of Congress to abolish the reservation. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the Puyallup Tribe could fish free 
from state interference in the portion of the Puyallup River lying 
within the reservation boundaries. The Supreme Court refused to 
hear the case. 111 
The second suit in federal court112 was brought by the United 
States to require the State of Washington to observe fishing rights 
guaranteed to numerous tribes, including the Puyallups. Specific 
findings of fact relating to the Puyallups were made. Although the 
case was basically concerned with off-reservation fishing, since the 
final decision regarding the Puyallup Reservation was still pending 
on appeal, the court held that on-reservation fishing was not subject 
to state regulation. 113 The court found that the state could regulate 
off-reservation fishing only if it satisfied the court that the regula-
101 Id. 
III United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 
(1974). The decision of the Court of Appeals that the Puyallup Reservation still existed had 
no effect on the state courts. The state courts relied on the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court had remanded that case to them as a basis for their continuing jurisdiction 
on the reservation. The iBBues of res judicata and collateral estoppel were never discussed by 
the state courts or in the majority decision of the Supreme Court. 
III United States v. Washington, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974). 
112 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aft'd, 520 F.2d 676 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). For a detailed analysis of the case and its 
implications see Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3. 
IlS See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _ U.S. _, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 n.5 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).·The exact sequence of the federal court cases is confusing but 
important to understand. First it was decided in an unreported decision that the Puyallup 
Reservation had been extinguished. Then, in another suit, United States v. Washington, 384 
F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), the fishing of numerous tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 
including the Puyallups, was discussed. In this case It was held that on-reservation fishing 
could not be regulated and that the tribes were entitled to the opportunity to catch 50% of 
the run off the reservation. Although no determination was made concerning the on-
reservation fishing of the Puyallups since it had been determined that the reservation had 
terminated, there was no evidence that the Puyallups would be treated any differently than 
any other tribe where on-reservation regulation was forbidden. After this decision, the first 
federal district court case was heard on appeal, and it was found that the Puyallup Reserva-
tion still existed. United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974). Then the second 
case involving the numerous tribes was affirmed. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
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tion was "reasonable and necessary" for conservation. It also con-
cluded that certain tribes could regulate fishing by their own mem-
bers free from state interference providing that they fulfill certain 
conditions designed to keep the state informed of their regulations 
and fishing activities. The court then decreed that the Puyallups 
were entitled to the opportunity to catch 50% of the harvestable 
steelhead off the reservation.1I4 Fishing of the Puyallups remained 
under the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to an order of the court. 
Such continuing jurisdiction was necessary to prevent non-Indians 
from interfering with the Indians' right to catch 50% of the run 
outside reservation boundaries, and to make certain that state regu-
lation of Indian fishing took place only when it was "necessary" for 
conservation purposes. 
D. Puyallup III 
Following these federal decisions regarding the status of the Puy-
allup Reservation and the on-reservation fishing rights of the Indi-
ans, the Washington State courts decided the Puyallup II issues on 
remand from the United States Supreme Court. The state superior 
court, while accepting the federal court of appeal's decision that the 
reservation still existed, determined that the state court's jurisdic-
tion extended on to the reservation.115 It then determined that, in 
light of the need to conserve the fishery, the Puyallups were entitled 
to the opportunity to catch 45% of the total natural steelhead run 
in the Puyallup River, and that they could use nets to catch their 
alloted share. liS 
The superior court's decision was affirmed by the Washington 
Supreme Court.117 That court found that the need for state regula-
'If The reason for the 50% determination was that the court viewed the Indians and other 
citizens as cotenants. Cotenants, however, are liable for waste, and the court found that the 
state could, if necessary, regulate the off-reservation fishing of the Indians for conservation 
purposes. The court stated that Indians and non-Indians share responsibility for the perpe-
tuation of the fish run. The federal court retained jurisdiction over the Indians' fishing. 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 1975). 
'" The decision of the State Superior Court is not reported. 
ttl Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 664, 667, 548 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1976). 
The Department of Game plants trout to increase the size of the run. The court found that 
the Puyallups were not entitled to a percentage of these fish since the program was funded 
by fees obtained from the purchase of fishing licenses by non-Indians. The state court found 
that the Puyallups were entitled to 45% of the entire run while the federal court found that 
the Indians could fish without state interference on the reservation and, in addition, were 
entitled to 50% of the run off the reservation. See note 114 and accompanying text, supra. 
tI7 Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 664, 548 P.2d 1058 (1976). 
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tions for conservation purposes argued in favor of state jurisdiction 
over the on-reservation fishing of the Puyallups. This determination 
was based upon two factors: first, the state was concerned with a 
matter wholey within its jurisdiction, that is, the determination of 
the extent to which it could apply its sovereign powers to regulate 
resources for the purposes of conservation; and second, the United 
States Supreme Court had specifically remanded this case for a 
determination of a fair allocation of the fish, which the state court 
read as giving it jurisdiction on the reservation. liS The court explic-
itly refused to defer jurisdiction to the federal courts. 
The underlying basis for the court's determination that it had 
jurisdiction was its contention that its jurisdiction was practical and 
consistent with the history of the Puyallup litigation: 
In order to control the escapement necessary for the conservation of the 
species, it is inescapable, given the geography in this case, that the State 
must be able to control on-reservation fishing activities. State regula-
tion of on-reservation fishing is mandated by, and consistent with, the 
Supreme Court's view of Indian treaty rights as presented in Puyallup 
II . .. .HI 
The court required the Tribe to submit lists of the names and num-
bers of tribal fishermen and the amount of fish that each caught. 
To deny the Puyallup's claim of tribal immunity, the court relied 
on the Supreme Court's finding that the instant suit was analagous 
to the prosecution of individual Indians for crimes committed off the 
reservation. l20 The fact that the fishing was now found to be taking 
place on the reservation did not cause the state court to dispute this 
analogy. 
The Puyallups appealed the state court's finding that the state 
could regulate on-reservation fishing. In Puyallup 111,121 the United 
States Supreme Court again explicitly refused to determine whether 
or not the reservation still existed, despite the continued vitality of 
the issue. 122 The Court summarily addressed the issue of jurisdiction 
"" Id. at 669, 548 P.2d at 1063. 
111 Id. 
121 See text at notes 92-94, supra. 
121 Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _ U.S. _, 97 S.Ct. 2616 (1977). 
"2 The Court in Puyallup III stated: 
The continued existence of the Puyallup reservation has been a matter of dispute on which 
we express no opinion. The Ninth Circuit, relying on our decision in Mattz u. Arnett, 412 
U.S. 481, held that the reservation did still exist, United States u. Washington, 496 F.2d 
620 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032. That decision ptl!dates our consideration of 
DeCoteau u. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, and'Rosebud Sioux u. Kniep, 
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stating that "Puyallup I settled an important threshold question in 
this case-regardless of tribal sovereign immunity, individual 
defendant-members of the Puyallup Tribe remain amenable to the 
process of the Washington courts in connection with fishing activi-
ties occurring off their reservation."123 Nonetheless, the Court found 
that the lower court lacked the power to order the Tribe to submit 
the names of its members or the size of their catch because the Tribe 
qua Tribe could not be sued in state court absent an effective waiver 
of its immunity claim. However, the Court also found that a suc-
cessful assertion of a claim of tribal sovereign immunity did not 
prevent the state court from adjudicating the rights of individual 
defendants over whom· it had properly obtained jurisdiction. l24 The 
fact that personal jurisdiction may not have been properly obtained 
in Puyallup I since the fishing, according to the federal court of 
appeals,125 occurred within reservation boundaries, was not consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in Puyallup III. 
While refusing to accept as binding the federal court's finding 
that the Puyallup Reservation still existed, the Supreme Court 
found that Article III of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, dealing with 
off-reservation fishing rights, was controlling. The Court did not 
expressly reiterate its earlier view that Article III was the only grant 
of fishing rights in the treaty. 128 Instead, it based its decision on the 
fact that the Puyallups had alienated in fee simple absolute all 
areas of the reservation abutting on the Puyallup River, and addi-
tionally, that regulation was necessary for conservation purposes. 127 
The Court also concluded that the state court had used a proper 
standard of conservation "necessity" in limiting the steelhead 
catch. 
A basic concern of the Supreme Court in Puyallup III was the 
possibility that the on-reservation fishing of the Indians could com-
pletely destroy the trout fishery in question. 
If Puyallup treaty fishermen were allowed untrammeled on-reservation 
fishing rights, they could interdict completely the migratory fish run 
_U.S._, No. 75-562 (Apri14, 1977). 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2621 n.11 (1977). 
12. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2620 (1977) (empha-
sis added). 
'" [d. 
'" United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 
(1974). 
12' See text at note 95, supra. 
'27 Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2622 (1977). 
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and 'pursue the last living (Puyallup River) steelhead until it enters 
their nets.' In this manner the treaty fishermen could totally frustrate 
both the jurisdiction of the Washington Courts and the rights of non-
Indian citizens of Washington recognized in the Treaty of Medicine 
Creek.'2R 
The Court added that "[t]he ability of on-reservation activity to 
completely destroy the resources in question has not been a factor 
in other cases which have rejected regulation."129 
In its concern for the conservation of the fishery, the Court ig-
nored several important points. First, the Puyallup fishing was 
being regulated by the federal district court.130 Second, even if the 
state did not have the power to regulate on-reservation fishing, Con-
gress did. 131 If the need for enforcing state regulations for the purpose 
of conservation was so great, Congress could grant the states the 
power to do so. Third, the Puyallups offered extensive evidence in 
their brief that they themselves were beginning a conservation pro-
ject to prevent the extermination of the fishery.132 
The Supreme Court's decision in Puyallup III leaves many issues 
unresolved, including whether or not the Puyallup Reservation is 
still in existence and what the basis is for establishing state jurisdic-
tion over on-reservation Indian affairs. Since the Court did not 
clearly define the factors involved in its decision, more analysis of 
Puyallup III is necessary before the impact of the decision can be 
determined. 
IV. INTERPRETING PUYALLUP ITI 
The Supreme Court's failure to make a determination regarding 
the reservation status of the Puyallups is the basis for the confusion 
surrounding the decision. Consequently, this article will focus on 
three possible interpretations of Puyallup III: the first will presup-
pose that the Court found the reservation had been terminated, the 
second will assume that the reservation still existed, and finally, the 
third will hold the Court to its word that the reservation status was 
unimportant. The plausibility and effect of each of these interpreta-
tions will be discussed. 
'" [d. at 2623. 
12. [d. at 2623 n.15. 
130 See note 14. supra. 
131 See text at notes 33-41. supra. 
132 Brief for Petitioners at 12. Puyallup Tribe. Inc. v. Dep't of Game. _U.S._. 97 S.Ct. 
2616 (1977). 
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A. No Reservation 
Throughout the Puyallup III decision, the Supreme Court seemed 
to imply that were it to consider the question anew, it would find 
that the Puyallup Reservation no longer existed. l33 In its discussion 
of the Tribe's assertion that the majority of the Indians' fishing took 
place within the reservation boundaries, the Court noted that "the 
continued existence of the Puyallup reservation has been a matter 
of dispute on which we express no opinion."134 It went on to add, 
however, that the court of appeal's finding that the reservation still 
existedl35 predated the Supreme Court's consideration of two other 
cases involving the determination of reservation status following the 
alienation of property. The two cases both resulted in a finding that 
the reservation in question had been terminated. l38 
If the Court was in fact deciding Puyallup III on the assumption 
that the reservation had been terminated, its decision to find the 
Article III nonexclusive, off-reservation fishing rights controlling 
would have been justified. So long as the tribe existed, the treaty 
would still be valid, and all rights not dependent upon the existence 
of the reservation would still be enforceable. In addition, if the 
Court was determining that the Puyallup Reservation had ceased to 
exist, its holding in Puyallup III would merely have continued the 
recent line of cases,137 including Puyallup I, which had found state 
regulation of off-reservation fishing to be permissible. l38 
Despite the ease with which the Court could have resolved the 
conflict in Puyallup III if it in fact had found that the Puyallup 
133 See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2621 n.ll 
(1977). 
IlfId . 
.lSI See text at note 110, supra. 
lSI In these two cases, Rosebud Sioux v. Kniep, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 1361 (1977), and 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), the Court found that the purpose of 
the congressional acts which allowed for the alienation of the reservation lands was to extin· 
guish the reservation. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), was distinguished on the grounds 
that the congressional intent in Mattz was not to extinguish the reservation. 
117 See Indian Treaty Analysis, supra note 3. The criticism of Puyallup I is based on several 
factors. First, treaties should be read in light of the probable understanding of the Indians at 
the time the treaties were signed. See text at note 14·15, supra. Also, courts have ignored the 
fact that the fishing rights reserved were between mutual sovereigns. See text at note 16, 
supra. The idea that while treaty rights may not be qualified, the exercise of these rights can, 
is mere sophistry. See text at note 99,supra. However, if Puyallup III had been based on the 
termination of the reservation, then it would not have created new problems for the courts 
other than those raised by Puyallup 1. 
118 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Baker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916); Tulee v. Washington, 
315 U.S. 681 (1942); State v. McCoy, 63 Wash.2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963). 
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Reservation had been terminated, it explicitly refused to make the 
termination of the reservation its basis for decision.13B Thus, the 
refusal to deal with this issue prevents interpreting Puyallup III as 
holding that the reservation was extinguished. Consequently, alter-
native readings of the decision must be examined. 
B. Reservation Still Ex'isted 
In light of the federal court's determination that the Puyallup 
Reservation still existed, and the state court's reliance on this hold-
ing,140 the Supreme Court may have based its decision on the contin-
ued existence of the Puyallup Reservation. In fact, despite the con-
tinued assertions by the Court that it refused to determine the sta-
tus of the reservation, it is likely that Puyallup III will be read as 
a grant of power to control on-reservation fishing of Indians in the 
name of conservation. By refusing to determine reservation status, 
the Court impliedly found that its determination could be applied 
to on-reservation affairs. Thus, the discussions based on a finding 
by the Court that the reservation still existed, and a finding that 
reservation status was not important, are closely intertwined. 
If the Court based its holding on the continued existence of the 
reservation, a major problem arises when one examines the basis 
. for the state court's jurisdiction over the Puyallup Indians. As dis-
cussed previously, states have no inherent jurisdiction on a reserva-
tion, and such jurisdiction can be obtained only through a congres-
sional grant. l41 In the instant case, Congress had granted the State 
of Washington civil and criminal jurisdiction on the reservation, but 
had expressly excluded jurisdiction over fishing rights guaranteed 
by treaty. 142 
The Supreme Court in Puyallup III determined that the state 
court could enforce its jurisdiction on a reservation when it had 
properly obtained jurisdiction off the reservation. 143 Yet, there are 
problems with obtaining such jurisdiction off the reservation.144 
.31 Whether, in light of its history, the reservation has been extinguished is a question this 
author does not reach . 
• 41 See text at notes 108 and 115-119, supra. Although the state court accepted the federal 
court's finding regarding the reservation, it still held that it had jurisdiction on the reserva-
tion. [d. The United States Supreme Court's failure to make a determination regarding the 
Puyallup Reservation implied an affirmance of the state court's decision . 
• 41 See text at notes 42-65, supra . 
• 42 See notes 57-59 and accompanying text, supra . 
• 43 See text at note 124, supra . 
• 44 State regulation of off-reservation fishing is criticized because such fishing rights were 
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More importantly, an immediate transfer of such jurisdiction onto 
the reservation disregards the well established principles of tribal 
sovereignty, the distinct and separate nature of reservations and the 
explicit and implied treaty rights. Finally, the individuals over 
whom the state courts had obtained personal jurisdiction in 
Puyallup I were no longer parties to the suit in Puyallup III, 145 and 
the Department of Game's regulations extended to all Puyallup 
fishermen, not only those involved in the original litigation. 
If Puyallup III is interpreted as a case either where it was deter-
mined that a reservation existed, or that reservation status was 
unimportant, the decision regarding jurisdiction could have wide-
rl;lnging ramifications. Since it has been established that a state 
may regulate the off-reservation fishing of the Indians, any Indian 
who participates in their treaty-guaranteed right of fishing off the 
reservation may now subject himself and all members of the tribe 
to on-reservation fishing regulation. The one limitation implied by 
the Puyallup III decision is that such state regulations must be 
necessary for the purposes of conservation. However, no working 
definition of "necessary" has yet been given by the Court. 14ft 
If the Court based its decision in Puyallup IlIon the fact that the 
Puyallup Reservation still existed, it should have referred to Article 
IT of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, which defined the Puyallups' 
rights on the reservation.147 As discussed previously, fishing rights 
are impliedly included in the exclusive rights secured to the Indians 
guaranteed by treaty, and, at the time the treaties were signed, the Indians did not know that 
they would be subject to state regulation. See note 137, supra. 
141 Just who the actual parties in the Puyallup suits were is a matter of much confusion. 
On a few occasions, tribal members appeared in their individual capacity before the Pierce 
County Superior Court. This was also the practice in certain appearances before the Washing-
ton Supreme Court. However, no such personal appearance of an individual defendant was 
ever filed in the United States Supreme Court. The major responsibility for the litigation was 
assumed by the tribe itself. In Puyallup 1lI, the Supreme Court treated the tribe as the only 
petitioner. It did not, however, find any difficulty with extending state jurisdiction onto the 
reservation with regard to individuals over whom the state had not obtained off-reservation 
jurisdiction. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2619 
n.7 (1977). 
I" See A Supreme Court Error, supra note 54, for alternative enforcement procedures. The 
Court itself noted that there will be enforcement problems with its decision: 
[A]lthough [the Tribe] properly resists the authority of the state court to order it to 
provide information with respect to the status of enrolled members of the Tribe and the 
size of their catch, it may find that its members' interests are best served by voluntarily 
providing such information to respondent and to the court in order to minimize the risk 
of an erroneous enforcement effort. 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2624 (1977). 
141 See text at note 30, supra. 
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on the reservation. 148 
The Court responded to the Puyallups' claim that Article II was 
controlling by announcing that "such an interpretation clashes with 
the subsequent history of the reservation and the facts of this 
case."149 The Court then noted that it had already been determined 
in Puyallup I that the only fishing rights in .question were those "in 
common with the citizens of the Territory."15o 
The facts of the case which the Court found to be decisive in 
rejecting the Article II arguments were: (1) that the Puyallups had 
alienated in fee simple absolute all but 22 acres of their reservation, 
with none of the remaining land abutting on the river, (2) that 
neither the Tribe nor its members continued to hold the Puyallup 
River fishing grounds for their "exclusive use,"151 (3) that the State 
had gained control over all civil and criminal actions of the Puyal-
lups on the reservation pursuant to Public Law 280,152 and (4) that 
the on-reservation fishing activities of the Puyallups could destroy 
the fishery. 153 
These factors should have been irrelevant if the Court implicitly 
found the reservation still in existence. The Court in Puyallup III 
ignored the fact that treaties are the supreme law of the land. 154 
Despite the existence of numerous persuasive reasons for imple-
menting conservation laws, the rights guaranteed by treaties cannot 
simply be ignored. In citing the fact that the Puyallups have alien-
ated their land, the Court chose to deal with the case as a mere 
question of property law. Yet the issue here is not a matter of prop-
erty law, it is a matter of Indian law, with a federal treaty control-
ling. The issue of whether the Puyallups alienated a substantial 
amount of their land should not be important, except possibly to the 
issue of reservation status. However, once one assumes that the 
reservation still exists, the question of alienation is irrelevant. 155 As 
'" See text at notes 23-26, supra. 
II. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2622 (1977). 
'50 Id. at 2622. The Court, by using this argument, ignores the fact that Puyallup I was 
involved with off-reservation fishing, while Puyallup III was concerned with on-reservation 
fishing, and different sections of the treaty should apply. 
'" The Court cited as proof of this statement the fact that non-Indians fish on the same 
waters as Indians. Id. at 2622. 
IS' Id. at 2622. . 
, .. Id. 
IS' The Court reinterpreted the Treaty of Medicine Creek to find that only Article III fishing 
rights were in question. If the reservation still existed, Article IT should control regardless of 
how much land the Puyallups alienated. See text at notes 66-72, supra. 
, .. Id. 
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the dissent noted in Puyallup III, "[u]nlike either Puyallup I or 
Puyallup II, the case before us must be determined under Art. II, 
which in plainest English provides for 'exclusive' fishing rights for 
the Puyallups."158 
The Court's reliance on Public Law 280 is also misplaced in the 
instant case. Public Law 280 specifically excludes hunting and fish-
ing treaty rights from state jurisdiction.157 The Court indicated that 
since the state had jurisdiction over all other areas on the reserva-
tion, there was no reason to exclude hunting and fishing rights. If 
this was the Court's argument, it was in contravention of a federal 
statute.158 Congress is invested with the power to promulgate treat-
ies and is the only body which can pass contrary legislation.159 It has 
chosen not to do so in the case of hunting and fishing rights. 
Finally, the Court seemed to rely most heavily on its view of the 
conservation crisis involved. As discussed previously, not only was 
this concern based on speculation, but it ignored the explicit terms 
of the Treaty of Medicine Creek. leo 
In the case of State v. Arthur,181 a case mentioned but rejected in 
Puyallup III since the Court found that the possibility of extinguish-
ing a fishery had not been considered, the Idaho court stated: 
We are not here concerned with the widsom of the provisions of the 
treaty under present conditions nor with the advisability of imposing 
upon the Indians certain regulatory obligations in the interest of con-
serving wild life; that is for the Federal Government, the affected tribe, 
and perhaps the State of Idaho to resolve under appropriate negotia-
tions; our concern here is only with reference to protecting the rights of 
the Indians which they reserved under the Treaty of 1855 to hunt upon 
open and unclaimed land without limitation, restriction or burden. l82 
'II Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, _U.S._, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2625 (1977) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). In alluding to the fact that the Puyallups no longer fished exclusively 
on the river, the Court seemed to be implying that the Puyallups had voluntarily given up 
their treaty fishing rights. This argument, however, ignores the fact that: 
[t]he Puyallups do not now hold their fishing grounds for their exclusive use precisely 
because the State has relentlessly sought for many years to prevent their doing so. Indeed, 
this very suit was begun 13 years ago in an effort to prevent the Puyallups from exercising 
what they claimed to be their treaty rights on their old reservation. 
Id. at 2627. 
157 See text at notes 57-59, supra. 
,II Id. 
'II See text at notes 9-11, supra. 
,II See text at notes 130-132, 156, supra. 
"' 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). 
liZ Id. at 265, 261 P.2d at 143. 
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If the Court had utilized an analysis similar to the Arthur court, the 
Puyallup holding would not be inconsistent with federal law. 183 
C. Reservation Status Unimportant 
Similar problems to those which occur in an interpretation of 
Puyallup III as holding that the reservation still existed reappear 
when one argues that the reservation status was unimportant. 
Again, questions of jurisdictional powers of the state and treaty 
interpretation remain unanswered. However, if the Court was hold-
ing that reservation status was unimportant, the results are more 
negative. First, such a holding ignores the traditional dichotomy of 
treatment of Indian actions on and off the reservations. 184 Second, 
it reinforces the contention that treaties are valueless by reaffirming 
a disinterest in reservation status. By claiming that conserving a 
fishery was more important than enforcing federally guaranteed 
rights, the Court took a great step towards destroying another en-
dangered species, Indian rights. . 
V. CONCLUSION 
The conflict faced by the Supreme Court in deciding Puyallup III 
was clear: the State of Washington wanted to enforce its fishing 
regulations while the Puyallups claimed immunity from such regu-
lation due to a treaty made with the United States government over 
100 years earlier. The Court was faced with two sympathetic issues, 
Indian rights and conservation. Unfortunately, the Court failed to 
recognize that alternative conservation methods could be utilized,185 
while the derogation of Indian rights could not be easily remedied.188 
The Court also ignored well established principles of Indian law 
which have developed over the years. 
Puyallup III poses a serious threat to the continued validity of 
treaties made with the Indians. Nowhere in the treaties does it say 
that problems of conservation will permit states to regulate on-
reservation fishing, yet this appears to be the holding of the case. 
While it is unrealistic to think that conservation would have been 
considered 100 years ago, the wisdom of Congress in making the 
'83 See text at note 59, supra. 
II. See text at notes 50-52, supra. 
II. See text at notes 126-132, supra. 
"' Congress can, of course, pass legislation returning such rights to the Indians. However, 
due to the political weakness of the Indians as a whole, this does not seem likely and would 
take years to accomplish. See Aboriginal Rights, supra note 6, at 503-04. 
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treaty or the affects of the treaty today are not properly before the 
Court. The Court must simply see that the treaty rights are en-
forced. Congress can enact legislation in contravention of the terms 
of an Indian treaty if it so chooses. In its decision, the Puyallup III 
Court implied that there are issues of national importance to which 
federally guaranteed Indian rights will have to yield. Since the ex-
clusive rights of Indians on their reservations have traditionally 
been excluded from state jurisdiction not only because of federal 
preemption but also because of tribal sovereignty, this sovereignty 
is in danger by the inclusion of on-reservation rights among those 
which may be forced to give way. 167 
Both the majority and the dissent in Puyallup III stated that the 
holding should be limited to the facts of the case. 16S The Court also 
stressed the importance ofthe fact that, in its view, the unrestricted 
fishing of the Puyallups could destroy the fishery.169 Perhaps this 
case should serve as a warning to other Indian tribes that they 
should rapidly become involved in conservation programs of their 
own. Puyallup III suggests that if conservation is not an issue, then 
on-reservation regulation will not be allowed absent congressional 
approval. However, steps should be taken to prevent the Court from 
establishing a new doctrine of on-reservation control, and the crea-
tion of Indian-sponsored conservation programs may be such a step. 
If Puyallup III is in reality limited to its facts, then Indian tribes 
whose reservation status is well defined may not be affected by the 
Court's decision. However, the ease with which the Court trans-
ferred off-reservation jurisdiction onto the reservation should not be 
ignored. The Court may cite Puyallup III as justification for extend-
ing state jurisdiction over Indian affairs in the future,170 and despite 
the existence of many unanswered questions, a new doctrine of total 
on-reservation state control may be born. 
"' See notes 32, 47 and accompanying text, supra. 
, .. The majority of the Court noted several times that it was rejecting the Puyallups' 
arguments "with particular reference to the facts of this case." Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't 
of Game, _U.S._, 197 S.Ct. 2616, 2622 (1977). Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opin-
ion, noted that the decision was limited to its facts. Id. at 2627. 
'" See text at notes 128-129, supra. 
"0 The basis for the argument that conservation allows states to regulate off-reservation 
fishing is found in the dicta of early Supreme Court cases. E.g., Ward v. Race House, 163 
U.S. 504 (1896); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). There is nothing in the treaties 
themselves which allows for conservation issues to take precedence over treaty rights. 
Puyallup Ill, despite its ambiguities, may be cited as authorizing on-reservation state control. 
